Centre for International Governance Innovation

WORLD REFUGEE COUNCIL

World Refugee Council Research Paper No. 4 – August 2018

Assessing the Impacts of Hosting Refugees

Sarah Deardorff Miller

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About the Series

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About the Author

Sarah Deardorff Miller consults on issues of forced migration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks and academic institutions. Sarah has recently carried out evaluations and research for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Bank, and also adjunct teaches for Columbia University, American University and the University of London. She has published various books and articles on forced displacement, including a recent book on Syrian displacement and another on the role of the UNHCR in protracted refugee situations. She has worked with refugee-focused NGOs in Tanzania, Thailand, Switzerland and the United States, working on everything from local integration to resettlement case management. She has also conducted research on refugee-related projects in the Middle East (Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), Asia (Thailand and Burma), and Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). She holds a doctorate in international relations from Oxford University (St. Antony's College), as well as a master of science degree in forced migration from Oxford, a master of arts degree in the social sciences from the University of Chicago, and a bachelor of arts degree in history, Spanish and international service from Valparaiso University. She currently lives in the New York area with her husband and two children.

Executive Summary

This paper reviews the existing research examining the impacts of refugee hosting through economic, social, political, environmental and security perspectives, identifying areas of consensus and debate and gaps in knowledge, policy and practice. It draws from the literature on forced migration and other research to consider how these assessments are made and where further tools are needed to better measure the impacts of hosting refugees. Much of the literature reveals that refugees need not be the burden they are often portrayed to be. However, it is also true that states that host refugees are often the least able to offer protection and assistance to refugees and may not be in political contexts where it is easy to implement policies that could foster mutually beneficial situations for refugees and hosts. The paper therefore engages current literature to consider how to better facilitate responsibility sharing in order to mitigate the negative impacts of hosting refugees.

The paper also provides a range of key lessons that can inform and encourage increased responsibility sharing, including increased resettlement, and suggests policies to foster full integration in northern states; in brief, policies that avoid encampment or closed settlements often provide greater opportunities for refugees to meaningfully interact with their host communities, access the labour market, and reduce tensions between hosts and refugees. Finally, it addresses the need for improved measurement tools for assessing the impacts of hosting refugees.

Introduction

Understanding the impacts of hosting refugees is at the centre of crafting responses that minimize the costs and risks assumed by host countries and communities, maximize the protection available to refugees, and utilize resources efficiently and effectively. Since the early 1980s, there have been numerous efforts to measure the costs and benefits associated with hosting refugees. This paper summarizes some of this literature and highlights the lessons from these efforts.

The states hosting the vast majority of the world's refugees tend to be those with the fewest resources to do so: the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports that some 84 percent of the world's refugees in 2016 were hosted by developing countries (UNHCR 2017). Moreover, approximately two-thirds of the total refugee population remain trapped in protracted refugee situations, many of which have dragged on for decades (ibid.; see also Loescher and Milner 2005b; Loescher et al. 2008). Refugees are also more likely to reside in urban areas than in camps, which both exposes them to different vulnerabilities and can impact the host country differently.

The global refugee regime emphasizes the need for responsibility sharing to ensure that countries hosting large numbers of asylum seekers are not overwhelmed and left alone to face the cost of granting asylum. Finding avenues for increased and effective responsibility sharing that can mitigate the negative impacts of hosting refugees is among the greatest ongoing challenges facing the global refugee regime.[1]

Economic Impacts of Hosting Refugees

There is extensive research on the economic impacts of hosting refugees, but scholars such as James Milner (2016, 2) continue to struggle with how to measure them:

> These questions have also long confounded scholars and practitioners. Initiatives in the 1980s found that while it was widely assumed that the presence of large refugee populations in poorer host states resulted in a range of burdens, the nature of these burdens was "almost impossible to verify with hard data" (Gorman 1987, 30). In response, a number of indicators have been used to measure the relative burden borne by various countries:
>
> - total number of refugees in a host country;

1 James Milner (2016) examines burden sharing through financial and physical forms and also summarizes the literature on burden sharing.

- number of refugees relative to the national population (refugees per capita); and
- number of refugees relative to the wealth of the country (refugees per capita GDP).

While some efforts have been made to refine these measures (Czaika 2005; World Bank 2010), these indicators remain the most widely used to rank countries according to the scale of their refugee burden. For example, the UNHCR (2015a) reported that Lebanon hosted the highest number of refugees per capita in 2015, with 209 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, followed by Jordan (90 per 1,000) and Nauru (51 per 1,000). Using the measure of number of refugees per US$1 GDP (purchasing power parity) per capita in 2015, Ethiopia was the most "burdened" with 469 refugees per US$1 GDP per capita, followed by Pakistan (322) and Uganda (216).

Some view the impact through the lens of protracted displacement, local integration, resettlement, burden/responsibility sharing, urban displacement, the rights of host states vis-à-vis protection responsibilities, or financial reform. Host states often argue that refugees are a strain on local resources; overwhelm health facilities and schools; strain infrastructure such as roads, bridges, warehousing facilities and the availability of land; and place a burden on social and administrative services. There is also concern that refugees take jobs from nationals, and drive up the cost of housing, goods and other services. The presence of refugees may also mean that a host government must pay salaries and expenses related to security and other officials, who are needed to carry out refugee-related tasks, including processing, setting up camps or settlements, and providing other health, education or social services. The cost of building supplies, and of purchasing and maintaining vehicles, may also be costs borne by a host state.[2] Moreover, the fact that refugees are often hosted in isolated, remote border areas that tend to be poor or limited in natural resources, only compounds the economic challenge of hosting refugees (UNHCR 2011). These challenges are often used to justify border closures, *refoulement*, confinement to camps and arbitrary detention, and other protection violations.

However, there is also a large body of scholarship that demonstrates how refugees can be an economic benefit.[3] When refugees have access to land, the labour market and livelihood opportunities and enjoy freedom of movement, they can have positive economic impacts by creating jobs, services and facilities, or by contributing to agricultural production and the local economy (UNHCR 2011). In Canada, for example, refugees report higher rates of employment, higher incomes and pay more taxes compared to other immigrant groups.[4] Uganda's policy of allowing refugees to self-settle,[5] for example, has enabled refugees to become more self-reliant and thus less dependent on aid and better able to contribute to their local communities (Hovil 2007; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004; Jacobsen 2001).[6] Alexander Betts et al. (2014) elaborate on refugee livelihoods in Uganda and challenge the idea that refugees are a burden on their host society. Instead, they argue that refugees can be economic assets; many are networked within settlements — nationally and transnationally — and, in many cases, use or create technology at higher rates than the local population through internet and mobile phone usage. Likewise, there are numerous examples of refugees in Uganda becoming successful entrepreneurs (ibid.; Global Agenda Council on Risk & Resilience 2016; Macchiavello 2003).

Refugees can also have positive economic impacts on their hosts by attracting development actors to work with the local community alongside aid workers, and refugees who are allowed to work can contribute to agricultural production and the local economy (Milner 2016, 3). For example, as the Ethiopia and Jordan Jobs Compacts begin to be evaluated, additional research on the economic impacts of hosting refugees will continue to emerge. Likewise, in reference to Tanzania, Milner writes,

2 Many of these costs are shared by the international community and may also depend on how long the refugees remain (that is, whether they are a protracted case).

3 For example, Milner (2016), Chambers (1986), Kibreab (1991), Jacobsen (2002a) and Betts et al. (2014). See also Legrain (2017). Some of this literature approaches refugee impact through the lens of a protracted refugee situation; other researchers are focused on local integration; still others fear that too much support to host countries can serve as a method of containment, whereby wealthy states seek to keep asylum seekers in their region of origin, even if that region is unable to cope.

4 See "Refugees in Canada: Statistics and Facts" at www.statista.com/topics/2897/refugees-in-canada/.

5 Refugees in Uganda can choose to remain in settlements (essentially, camps), or to self-settle, that is, choose where they will live. Generally, those who choose to self-settle forfeit their rights of formal assistance and must find their own housing and employment.

6 Other examples include Tibetan refugees in Nepal (Jacobsen 2001) and refugees in Cyprus (Zetter 1991), the Ivory Coast (Harrell-Bond 2002) and Kenya (ibid., 9).

"One NGO [non-governmental organization] worker remembered that when he arrived in Kibondo in 1997, only two buses a week passed through the town, there were very few consumer goods for sale in the local shops, and there was only one telephone line out of the town. By 2004, there were three or four bus services a day, each bringing a wide range of fresh consumer goods into town, and two companies providing coverage for mobile telephones (interview, Kibondo 2004; IRIN 2002b)" (Milner 2009b, 126).

Likewise, a recent study on Congolese camps in Rwanda indicates that both cash aid and in-kind assistance provide a boost to local economies by increasing the spending capacity of refugees in their host communities (Taylor et al. 2016). Another study on Mozambican refugees in Malawi highlights the creation of employment, the accrual of benefits to the local population, the stimulation of local commerce and an improved international image (Dzimbiri 1993). Indeed, the presence of international aid can greatly alter local economies by bringing in new actors (the United Nations, NGOs and other groups), which affect everything from cash flow in local markets to housing costs to infrastructure and relations with local authorities.[7] Refugee self-sufficiency can help to reduce aid costs (Jacobsen and Fratzke 2016).

Studies on refugees in Kenya have also found that refugees can be an economic benefit through the international aid that they attract (Sanghi, Onder and Vermuru 2016). The refugee presence in Kakuma, Kenya, boosted the gross regional product by over three percent and increased employment by about three percent (ibid.). The Turkana area also experienced development as a result of the refugee presence, and economic integration raised per capita host incomes by six percent (ibid.). Other research cites examples in Malawi, Albania, Macedonia, Jordan, Pakistan and Tanzania where refugees have had positive effects, either through camps stimulating local economies with greater demand or by attracting international organizations that help to bring resources, technology and jobs to an otherwise poor or remote area (Gomez and Christensen 2010; Landau 2008; Miller 2017; Milner 2009b; Harrell-Bond 1986; Harrell-Bond 2002; Long 2013; Jacobsen and Fratzke 2016). Of course, the gains from the presence of international organizations also wane if those actors pull out over time.

Recent studies on Syrian refugees indicate the potential positive economic impacts of hosting refugees (Rubin 2017). A study by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) finds that Syrian refugees can cause some economic strain upon immediate arrival, but that they are also consumers and economic actors who can boost local markets as time passes (IRC 2016, 5). Likewise, research from the Brookings Institution argues that Syrian refugees tend to not take jobs from Jordanians, but rather from low-skilled immigrants in Jordan in construction, agriculture and retail (Karasapan 2015). Syrian refugee entrepreneurs have also boosted the economy with new firms, jobs and services or products, totalling $1 billion[8] invested by Syrians in Jordan in 2013 (ibid.). Even within the very large Zaatari camp in Jordan, Syrian entrepreneurs have built a range of businesses, from pizza shops to barber shops, travel agencies, vegetable stalls and wedding rentals (Gavlack 2014).

Private sector actors, including high-profile actors — German automation giant Siemens; the world's largest furniture retailer, IKEA; and the international shipping and package service company DHL — have also become increasingly involved in refugee-hosting situations across a range of sectors and parts of the market: telecommunications, information technology and data management; banking and mobile money services; education; medicine; procurement logistics and shipping; water and sanitation; energy supply; private (paramilitary) security; protection and insurance. The IKEA Foundation committed almost $200 million to the UNHCR's programs in cash and kind since 2010 for shelter development and emergency relief for Syrian refugees,[9] and other companies like it are becoming increasingly involved.

Other research on Europe and North America also points to potential benefits — refugees often bring capital with them and add to entrepreneurial activity upon resettling. The European Parliament (Karakas 2015), for example, published a study that shows how refugees can positively affect the economy by addressing demographic trends, contributing to innovation, entrepreneurship and GDP growth. Another study focused on Europe also found that refugees can contribute to greater market flexibility, and improve fiscal sustainability (European Commission 2016), conclusions endorsed by a recent study from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

7 For more, see Slaughter and Crisp (2008; 2009), Landau (2008) and Miller (2017).

8 All dollar values cited are US currency.

9 See www.unhcr.org/en-us/ikea-foundation.html.

(2017) on labour market integration of refugees in Germany. A Tent Foundation report (Legrain 2016) also emphasizes the positive contributions that refugees can make to developed economies. It argues that one euro invested in refugees can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits over time; as refugees are given the opportunity to become entrepreneurs, innovators, taxpayers, consumers and investors, they create jobs, raise productivity and wages of local workers, lift capital returns, stimulate international trade and investment, and boost innovation, enterprise and growth (ibid.). This study cites evidence from the International Monetary Fund that calculates that additional spending in the European Union on refugees of 0.09 percent of GDP in 2015 and 0.11 percent in 2016 will raise its GDP by 0.13 percent by 2017. With the boost to the economy from refugees working, the GDP could be 0.23 percent higher by 2020 — contributing a total increase of 0.84 percent of GDP between 2015 and 2020. The study further argues that refugee populations tend to have younger, working-age individuals that could support aging societies such as Germany or Italy. Refugees also provide remittances that boost the sending country's income.[10]

Research on resettled refugees also points to positive economic contributions. Data for refugees in the United States, for example, indicates that despite an initial cost in assistance to refugees resettling to the United States, over the years, refugees are a net gain to the economy (Refugee Council USA 2017; Capps et al. 2015). Local studies in Ohio, for example, argue that refugees have been an asset to the local and regional area over the years (Chmura Economics and Analytics 2013; US Together et al. 2015). They highlight that refugees tended to find employment within five months of their arrival and to work their way off of government assistance within the first few years. The total economic impact of refugees in the area was $48 million and 650 jobs in 2012 (Chmura Economics and Analytics 2013). Refugees purchased 248 homes over the last decade and were above average compared to national norms in socio-economic integration (ibid.). Refugees that own businesses create jobs and provide goods and services; resettlement agencies spend money to provide services; and refugee workers contribute to the local economy (US Together et al. 2015). Another study on the economic impact of refugees and immigrants in Akron, Ohio, also pointed to positive returns via taxes, purchase of homes, and work in manufacturing and service sector jobs. They note that some 86 percent of refugees were of working age in 2013, which helped to support an aging population (New American Economy and Knight Foundation 2016). The case of Ohio is supported by national research on resettlement in the United States by other scholars. Randy Capps et al. (2015), for example, observed that refugees resettled in the United States are more likely to be employed than the US-born population, and that their incomes rise substantially as a function of the length of time that they are in the United States. Over time, refugees' participation in public benefit programs declines, and they generally come to own their own homes and become US citizens (ibid.; Kallick and Mathema 2016).

10 For more EU-focused research, see Zetter (2013); OECD, World Bank and the International Labour Organization (2015).

Environmental Impacts of Hosting Refugees

The large-scale arrival and prolonged presence of refugees can have negative impacts on the environment, including deforestation; de-vegetation; erosion; the destruction, degradation and pollution of water sources and catchment areas; illegal poaching and fishing; and overgrazing.[11] In some cases, locals are required to surrender arable land for the construction of refugee camps or settlement areas; forests may be stripped as refugees need poles for houses and latrines, firewood, medicine, thatching and fodder, and fuelwood. Likewise, heavy trucks that transport food and other relief may damage roads (Dzimbiri 1993). Refugees are also often placed in "already environmentally-hostile arid locations with minimal vegetation and variable access to sufficient water, particularly for livestock and growing vegetables" (Martin et al. 2017).[12] Thus, they may be forced to use what they can and thereby contribute to the further depletion of natural resources.

Protracted refugee situations, in particular, can exacerbate environmental concerns, including

11 Regarding Tanzania, see Rutinwa and Kamanga (2003); see also UNHCR (2011).

12 For more valuable research on the environment, see also Susan Martin et al.'s literature review and reports on environmental resources management online at https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/0utki51aeyatva661lu6vqf7rgaz6j5z and https://isim.georgetown.edu/EnvironmentalImpactofRefugeeCamps, respectively.

food security and sanitation. Large camps like Dadaab in Keyna or Zaatari in Jordan can have particularly negative effects on the environment, including soil erosion, loss of habitat and wildlife, air pollution, water contamination and water depletion (ibid.). They may also be located near national parks or reserves, which can create risks for the conservation of those areas (Shepherd 1995). These remote locations have often been linked to other risks, including risks of sexual and gender-based violence that women may face when they are forced to walk long distances to retrieve firewood (Shepherd 1995). Likewise, whether refugees are able to self-settle or forced to remain in camps or settlements can determine their environmental impact on the host country (Jacobsen 1997). For example, refugees forced to remain in camps in remote areas — as opposed to refugees who choose to self-settle in an urban area — would have to use natural resources differently, perhaps deforesting certain areas, for example.

That said, refugees can also bring positive environmental effects, most noticeably with the attraction of international aid and development actors who may undertake projects to protect the environment. Bonaventure Rutinwa and Khoti Kamanga (2003), for example, note that these efforts have had positive impacts in Tanzania. Moreover, scholars urge caution in arriving at simple conclusions on the environmental impact of refugees, noting that the relationship is complex and relates to a host of wider social, economic and political factors (Black 1994). Research in Ethiopia, for example, indicates that refugee camps had "relatively insignificant impacts to the existing natural resources and conflict and competition in these two camps [Aysaita and Al Addeh] was not as pronounced as previously assumed." New studies on the relationship between climate change and urban populations are also needed.[13]

13 For additional literature, see also Jacobsen (1997) and Oucho (2007).

Social Impacts of Hosting Refugees

The social impacts of refugees on host countries are far more difficult to measure. The UNHCR notes that "when large numbers of refugees arrive in a country — and especially when they are in a destitute situation and do not share ethnic or cultural linkages with the host community — there is always a risk that social tensions, conflicts and even violence might arise" (UNHCR 2011). Other studies show that while refugees might be able to economically integrate with ease, social integration can be more difficult (Institute for Market Economics 1999). Likewise, there are a number of studies that discuss how refugee camps are perceived as increasing social problems and tensions in communities, including alcohol consumption, gambling, prostitution and crime (Codjoe et al. 2013). Additional research reveals some concern about the long-term mental health impacts on members of the host community, in particular when they are hosting refugees or other displaced groups for long periods of time.[14]

However, not all social impacts of hosting refugees or other displaced people are necessarily negative. A study on health systems in Cameroon, for example, found that refugees did not necessarily have negative impacts on health systems, and in some cases, they even contributed to improvements (Tatah et al. 2016). Other research shows that the refugee presence and "pursuit of livelihoods can increase human security because economic activities help to recreate social and economic interdependence within and between communities" (Jacobsen 2002b, 95). Refugees and host communities can gain through inclusive policies, leading to less aid dependence and more resiliency.[15] Social impacts are also highly contextual: the effects of refugees staying with family members in a host country, versus those in a camp or settlement for decades, might present very different social outcomes for displaced persons and hosts. Other studies on social cohesion, for example, also demonstrate how protracted

14 See, for example, Messiah et al. (2016).

15 See the literature review for Georgetown University's Environmental Impact of Refugee Camps Project at https://isim.georgetown.edu/EnvironmentalImpactofRefugeeCamps. See also Cosgrave (1996), Jacobsen (2002b), Kaiser (2006) and Harrell-Bond (1998).

situations and policies that foster integration can positively or negatively affect social cohesion: when refugees are given greater access to their rights and are better able to integrate, social cohesion is greater within the community.[16]

Political Impacts of Hosting Refugees

Local government and administrations, including law enforcement and the judiciary, may face additional pressures upon hosting refugee populations, even if they receive assistance from the UNHCR and other agencies (Rutinwa and Kamanga 2003, 6). In addition to trying to coordinate different actors and a response, they are also under pressure from host communities to maintain security and stability. At the same time, there are new jobs from international organizations to process, manage and secure refugee areas, which create employment opportunities for host communities. Among Mozambican refugees in Malawi, for example, studies indicate mixed results: there was a significant strain on administration structures and health facilities, but there were also many new jobs (Dzimbiri 1993).

Likewise, as much as physical and social infrastructure (including roads, bridges, airstrips and school buildings), health, education and water supply may be strained by a refugee presence, they also present political opportunities (Rutinwa and Kamanga 2003). New roads, mobile phone service, expanded markets and increased opportunities may all emerge as positive impacts from the presence of refugees, all of which become part of political dialogues and campaigns, as well.[17] In some cases, the large presence of international aid actors that accompany refugee populations can have significant political repercussions, including the rebalancing of power away from local government authorities toward UN or NGO actors.[18] There has also been an increase in the incorporation of refugees into political platforms, which in many cases include negative views of refugees.

Security Impacts of Hosting Refugees

The security implications of hosting refugees are the concerns raised most frequently by host states. Several studies have been conducted on the security impacts refugees may have on their hosts. There is some research indicating that refugees have the potential to destabilize the countries that take them in. This may come in the form of political activists seeking to use the host country as a base for mobilizing and recruiting insurgents (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). Host countries can also be vehicles of spillover violence, if those arriving bring weapons or militant ideologies with them, or possibly even harbour fighters masquerading as refugees (Lischer 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Some have even argued that refugees can create tensions or imbalances between local groups, thus contributing to violence or instability. Likewise, when solutions remain elusive, protracted refugee situations can pose a host of other security issues.[19] These may be contained to the local host area or may relate to broader security complications for the region. Resettlement countries have also invoked security concerns, in particular as relates to terrorism and countering violent extremism.

The evidence, however, suggests that many of these security concerns may be exaggerated, or exacerbated by the conditions in which refugees are hosted. While there can never be a security guarantee, the real risks of hosting refugees are very low, particularly in countries with rigorous screenings (Byman 2015; Bolfrass, Shaver and Zhou 2015). Alex Bolfrass, Andrew Shaver and Yang-Yang Zhou (2015), for example, demonstrate the flawed logic in the idea that terrorist fighters would seek to hide among refugee populations being resettled. They write that "the results are clear: there is no positive association between refugee populations and subsequent outbreaks of civil violence. Indeed, the opposite may be true" (ibid.). They continue:

16 See, for example, Creedon et al. (2018).

17 For more, see Landau (2008).

18 See Miller (2017), Slaughter and Crisp (2008; 2009), Kagan (2011) and Landau (2008). Lewis B. Dzimbiri (1993) also asks to what extent hosting refugees requires a state to surrender some of its autonomy in order to remain in accordance with international protection standards.

19 See Loescher and Milner (2005a) and Rutinwa and Kamanga (2003).

"There are no grounds to suspect that those fleeing Syria and Iraq pose a bigger threat to the communities that receive them than did previous refugees....In the end, the reception they receive from local populations and host states will matter far more than where they come from" (ibid.).[20] Moreover, they note that refugees are "mostly incapable of — or averse to — fighting" (ibid.), citing surveys that show that refugees tend to have a psychological aversion to conflict, in particular those who have personally experienced violence. It is also possible for refugees to contribute to global security, justice and accountability if they are able to provide testimony against a war criminal from their former home country.

Key Lessons

The previous sections have explored literature and other research pertaining to economic, environmental, political, social and security impacts of hosting refugees. The paper now pulls from the literature to examine how increased responsibility sharing can be achieved, and offers key lessons that emerge in the literature.

→ States in the Global North must recognize that the vast majority of the world's refugees are hosted in the Global South, and that these countries assume significant challenges and immense responsibilities in hosting refugees.[21]

→ Northern states should then follow through with increased resettlement and policies that foster the full integration of refugees in their territories. Doing so may require additional resources and public campaigning to overcome problematic narratives about refugees that portray them as a drain on the economy or a security threat.

→ Under more open policies, refugees can be an economic benefit to their host communities in the long term:

- Refugees bring skills and buying power, and can be an asset to the labour market.
- Many refugees utilize technology, and when given the opportunity, establish businesses that can create jobs and wealth.

→ Refugees do not pose any more of a security risk than the general population. While each situation is different, refugees are no more likely to be involved in crime than the general population.

→ Policies that avoid encampment or closed settlements often provide greater opportunities for refugees to meaningfully interact with host communities and access the labour market. They can also reduce tensions between hosts and refugees and foster win-win environments, whereby refugees and their hosts benefit.

→ There is a need for additional research and the creation of metrics that can better inform policy makers on the impacts of hosting refugees.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the impacts of refugee hosting through economic, social, political, environmental and security perspectives. It has discussed a range of forced migration scholarship to consider how these assessments are made and where further tools are needed to better measure the impacts of hosting refugees. The paper has also offered key lessons revealed in the literature that can foster increased responsibility sharing in order to mitigate the negative impacts of hosting refugees. Given that the majority of refugees are hosted by countries that are least able to respond to their needs, and in light of the current momentum to seek out better responses to large-scale and protracted displacement, these lessons are important starting points for encouraging greater responsibility sharing in the world today.

20 Other research also indicates that resettled refugees pose little security threats. The Migration Policy Institute, for example, notes that the United States resettled 789,000 refugees between September 11, 2001, and October 2015, of which only three were arrested for planning terrorist attacks, two of which were outside the United States (Newland 2015). See also O'Toole (2015).

21 See Milner (2016) for recommendations on how to improve burden and responsibility sharing.

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About CIGI

We are the Centre for International Governance Innovation: an independent, non-partisan think tank with an objective and uniquely global perspective. Our research, opinions and public voice make a difference in today's world by bringing clarity and innovative thinking to global policy making. By working across disciplines and in partnership with the best peers and experts, we are the benchmark for influential research and trusted analysis.

Our research programs focus on governance of the global economy, global security and politics, and international law in collaboration with a range of strategic partners and support from the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario, as well as founder Jim Balsillie.

À propos du CIGI

Au Centre pour l'innovation dans la gouvernance internationale (CIGI), nous formons un groupe de réflexion indépendant et non partisan doté d'un point de vue objectif et unique de portée mondiale. Nos recherches, nos avis et nos interventions publiques ont des effets réels sur le monde d'aujourd'hui car ils apportent de la clarté et une réflexion novatrice pour l'élaboration des politiques à l'échelle internationale. En raison des travaux accomplis en collaboration et en partenariat avec des pairs et des spécialistes interdisciplinaires des plus compétents, nous sommes devenus une référence grâce à l'influence de nos recherches et à la fiabilité de nos analyses.

Nos programmes de recherche ont trait à la gouvernance dans les domaines suivants : l'économie mondiale, la sécurité et les politiques mondiales, et le droit international, et nous les exécutons avec la collaboration de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et le soutien des gouvernements du Canada et de l'Ontario ainsi que du fondateur du CIGI, Jim Balsillie.

About the World Refugee Council

There are more than 21 million refugees worldwide. Over half are under the age of 18. As a growing number of these individuals are forced to flee their homelands in search of safety, they are faced with severe limitations on the availability and quality of asylum, leading them to spend longer in exile today than ever before.

The current refugee system is not equipped to respond to the refugee crisis in a predictable or comprehensive manner. When a crisis erupts, home countries, countries of first asylum, transit countries and destination countries unexpectedly find themselves coping with large numbers of refugees flowing within or over their borders. Support from the international community is typically ad hoc, sporadic and woefully inadequate.

Bold Thinking for a New Refugee System

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is leading a consensus-driven effort to produce a new Global Compact for refugees in 2018. The World Refugee Council (WRC), established in May 2017 by the Centre for International Governance Innovation, is intended to complement its efforts.

The WRC seeks to offer bold strategic thinking about how the international community can comprehensively respond to refugees based on the principles of international cooperation and responsibility sharing. The Council is comprised of thought leaders, practitioners and innovators drawn from regions around the world and is supported by a research advisory network.

The WRC will explore advances in technology, innovative financing opportunities and prospects for strengthening existing international law to craft and advance a strategic vision for refugees and the associated countries.

The Council will produce a final report grounded by empirical research and informed by an extensive program of outreach to governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society. The Council aims to have concluded its work by early 2019.

À propos du Conseil mondial pour les réfugiés

Il y a en ce moment dans le monde plus de 21 millions de réfugiés, et plus de la moitié d'entre eux ont moins de 18 ans. En outre, de plus en plus de personnes sont forcées de quitter leur pays natal et partent à la recherche d'une sécurité, et elles sont alors confrontées aux limites importantes qui existent quant aux possibilités d'accueil et à la qualité de ce dernier. À cause de cette situation, les réfugiés passent maintenant plus de temps que jamais auparavant en exil.

En ce moment, le système de protection des réfugiés ne permet pas de réagir adéquatement à la crise des réfugiés d'une façon planifiée et globale. Quand une crise éclate, les pays de premier asile, les pays de transit et les pays de destination finale se retrouvent sans l'avoir prévu à devoir composer avec un grand nombre de réfugiés qui arrivent sur leur territoire, le traversent ou en partent. Et le soutien fourni dans ce contexte par la communauté internationale est en règle générale ponctuel, irrégulier et nettement inadéquat.

Des idées audacieuses pour un nouveau système de protection des réfugiés

Le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCNUR) dirige des efforts découlant d'un consensus et visant à instaurer un nouveau « pacte mondial pour les réfugiés » en 2018. Mis sur pied en mai 2017 par le Centre pour l'innovation dans la gouvernance international (CIGI), le Conseil mondial pour les réfugiés (CMR) veut compléter ces efforts.

Le CMR vise à proposer une réflexion stratégique audacieuse sur la manière dont la communauté internationale peut réagir de façon globale aux déplacements de réfugiés, et ce, en se fondant sur les principes de la coopération international et du partage des responsabilités. Formé de leaders, de praticiens et d'innovateurs éclairés provenant de toutes les régions du globe, le CMR bénéficie du soutien d'un réseau consultatif de recherche.

Le CMR examinera les progrès techniques, les occasions de financement novatrices ainsi que les possibilités pour ce qui est de renforcer le droit international et d'y intégrer une vision stratégique pour les réfugiées et les pays concernés.

Par ailleurs, le CMR produira un rapport final fondé sur des recherches empiriques et sur les résultats d'un vaste programme de sensibilisation ciblant les gouvernements, les organisations intergouvernementales et la société civile. Son objectif est de terminer son travail au début de 2019.

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